Skip to main content
Log in

Conspiracy Law and Jurisprudence in Canada: Towards an Economic Approach

  • Published:
Review of Industrial Organization Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Baker, Jonathan B. (1993) ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’, Antitrust Bulletin, Spring, 143-219.

  • Besanko, David and Thomas P. Lyon (1993) ‘Equilibrium Incentives for Most-Favoured Customer Clauses in an Oligopolistic Industry’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11, 347-367.

    Google Scholar 

  • Church, Jeffrey and Roger Ware (1998) ‘Abuse of Dominance under the 1986 Canadian Competition Act’, Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 85-129.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, Thomas E. (1986) ‘Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion’, Rand Journal of Economics, 17(3), 377-388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crampton, Paul S. and Joel T. Kissack (1993) ‘Recent Developments in Conspiracy Law and Enforcement: New Risks and Opportunities’, McGill Law Journal, 38, 569-619.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dick, Andrew R. (1996) ‘If Cartels Were Legal, Would Firms Fix Prices?’, mimeo, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.

  • Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro (1990) ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’, American Economic Review, 80, 107-126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaudet, Gérard and Stephen W. Salant (1991) ‘Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes’, American Economic Review, 81, 658-665.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hay, George A. (1992) ‘Market Power in Antitrust’, Antitrust Law Journal, 60, 807-827.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holt, Charles A. and David T. Scheffman (1987) ‘Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies’, Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 187-197.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard, John L. and W. T. Stanbury (1990) ‘Oligopoly, Coordination and Conscious Parallelism’, in G. F. Mathewson, M. J. Trebilcock and M. Walker (eds.), The Law and Economics of Competition Policy. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, pp. 219-294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennish, Timothy and Thomas Ross (1997) ‘Toward a New Canadian Approach to Agreements Between Competitors’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 28, 22-68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, Dan (1990) ‘Horizontal Mergers: The 50-Percent Benchmark’, American Economic Review, 80, 1238-1245.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lusk, Russell W. (1991) ‘Conspiracy: From What Evidence Is It Appropriate to Find An Agreement?’, in R. S. Khemani and W. T. Stanbury, eds, Canadian Competition Law and Policy at the Centenary, Chapter 7. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy.

    Google Scholar 

  • McAfee, Preston R. and Michael A. Williams (1992) ‘Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 15, 181-187.

    Google Scholar 

  • McFetridge, Donald G. (1998) ‘Merger Enforcement under the Competition Act after Ten Years’, Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 25-56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, Martin K. and Robert H. Porter (1985) ‘Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger’, American Economic Review, 75, 219-227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Thomas (1991) ‘Proposals For A New Canadian Competition Law On Conspiracy’, Antitrust Bulletin, Winter, 851-882.

  • Ross, Thomas W. (1998) ‘Introduction: The Evolution of Competition Law in Canada’, Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 1-23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salant, Stephen W., Sheldon Switzer and Robert J. Reynolds (1983) ‘Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 185-199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salop, Steven C. (1986) ‘Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination’, in Joseph E. Stiglitz and G. Frank Mathewson, eds, New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, Chapter 7. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanbury, W. T. (1991) ‘Legislation to Control Agreements in Restraint of Trade in Canada: Review of the Historical Record and Proposals for Reform’, in R. S. Khemani and W. T. Stanbury, eds, Canadian Competition Law and Policy at the Centenary. Halifax, The Institute for Research in Public Policy, pp. 61-148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanbury, W. T. and G. B. Reschenthaler (1977) ‘Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory, Policy and the Canadian Cases’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 15, 617-700.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanbury, W. T. (1998) ‘Expanding Responsibilities and Declining Resources: The Strategic Responses of the Competition Bureau, 1986–1996’, Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 205-241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, George (1968) ‘The Theory of Oligopoly’, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44-61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warner, Presley L. and Michael J. Trebilcock (1993) ‘Rethinking Price-Fixing Law’, McGill Law Journal, 38, 679-723.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wetston, Howard I. (1991) ‘Recent Developments in Competition Law: The Perspective of the Bureau of Competition Policy’, Presentation to the Law Society of Upper Canada, Toronto, April 26, 1991.

  • Willig, Robert D. (1991) ‘Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines’, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 281-332.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hughes, P., Sanderson, M. Conspiracy Law and Jurisprudence in Canada: Towards an Economic Approach. Review of Industrial Organization 13, 153–176 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007795305951

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007795305951

Keywords

Navigation