Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency

Abstract

In an earlier article in this journal, Sefton and Yavas (1995) concluded that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to overshifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, in general, there is no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks–Kaldor compensation principle.

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References

  1. Sefton, M., and A. Yavas. (1995). “The Welfare Effects of a Subsidy to Multiple Listing Services,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 11 (July), 85–90.

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  2. Varian, H. R. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd ed. New York: Norton. 1992.

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TURNBULL, G.K. Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 14, 365–370 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007770831648

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  • multiple listing service
  • efficient subsidy