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Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined – Reply

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, University of Florida, P.O. Box 117140, Gainesville, FL, 32611-7140, U.S.A

    Roger D. Blair & Richard E. Romano

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  1. Roger D. Blair
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  2. Richard E. Romano
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Blair, R.D., Romano, R.E. Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined – Reply. Review of Industrial Organization 12, 291–294 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007728122498

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007728122498

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