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Argumentation as Rule-Justified Claims: Elements of a Conceptual Framework for the Critical Analysis of Argument

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The paper outlines a conceptual framework for the critical assessment of argumentation which differs in some of its core characteristics from conventional approaches: it is resolutely semantic rather than formal in its method; it centers on obligations rather than beliefs; and its analytical focus is on the contingent necessity of conclusions, rather than on their persuasiveness or formal validity. The paper briefly illustrates the applications of this conceptual framework by reanalyzing a couple of examples taken from the argumentation analysis literature.

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Inbar, M. Argumentation as Rule-Justified Claims: Elements of a Conceptual Framework for the Critical Analysis of Argument. Argumentation 13, 27–42 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007703608951

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