Abstract
Two studies were conducted with the aim of demonstrating anchoring induced biases in consumer price negotiations.
In Study 1, 96 undergraduate students of business administration who were recruited as subjects played the role of buyers of a condominium. All subjects were given the same market information. They were then asked to state whether their reservation price was higher or lower than an arbitrary price example (irrelevant anchor) that for different groups of subjects was either low or high. Finally, subjects indicated their reservation price. As would be predicted if adjustments from the anchor are insufficient, the indicated reservation price was lower when the anchor was low than when it was high.
In Study 2, employing 64 undergraduate students of psychology who conducted dyad negotiations about the price of condominiums, the effect of the irrelevant anchor on the initially indicated reservation price was replicated. In addition, an anchoring effect of the seller's initial offer was observed. The results also revealed effects of both irrelevant anchor and initial offer on the purchase price.
From a public policy point of view, the results imply that consumers may be strongly influenced by irrelevant anchors provided by sellers. Provision of accurate market price information may however lessen the impact of irrelevant anchors.
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Kristensen, H., Gärling, T. Anchoring Induced Biases in Consumer Price Negotiations. Journal of Consumer Policy 23, 445–460 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007280722313
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007280722313