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Corporate Ownership Structure in Austria

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Abstract

This paper aims to add to the knowledge about ownership structure in Austria. It assesses ownership concentration and the relative importance of the investor categories banks, the state, families, and domestic and foreign firms on the basis of a sample of 600 of the largest non-financial corporations. Balance sheet data, internal rates of return calculations and regression estimates show that not only ownership concentration, but also the identity of the large controlling shareholder is relevant to efficient governance of corporations. While foreign control increases profitability, particularly state control is detrimental to shareholder wealth maximization. Likewise, profit margin equation estimates cannot reject the entrenchment hypothesis and/or expropriation of minority shareholders.

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Authors
  1. Klaus Gugler
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Gugler, K. Corporate Ownership Structure in Austria. Empirica 25, 285–307 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006967517368

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006967517368

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