Abstract
According to Kelsen, law is a sensecontent and law has authority. The combination ofthese two claims appears puzzling. How is it possiblefor a sense content to have authority? Kelsen's notionof `basic norm' seems to provide an answer to thisquestion. Such an answer, however, simply leads to anew formulation of the question itself. How is a basicnorm possible? Kelsen's multiple and tentative answersto this question turn out to be untenable. A differentstarting point might be provided by Kelsen's notion of`social power'. On closer scrutiny, however, anempowerment account of Kelsen's concept of theauthority of law proves unsatisfactory. Thus, ourreview of some candidate models for a Kelsenianexplication of the authority of law shows that none ofthem is a viable hypothesis. Kelsen's concept of theauthority of law is, at bottom, unintelligible.
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Celano, B. Kelsen's Concept of the Authority of Law. Law and Philosophy 19, 173–199 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006410024516
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006410024516