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The Irrationality of Merciful Legal Judgement: Exclusionary Reasoning and the Question of the Particular

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Abstract

In this paper I attempt to bring together (at least) two very different debates: one on justice, mercy and particularity, the other on the play of exclusionary reasons. My aim is to show how the discussion of the uneasy co-existence of justice and mercy pivots on the question of particularity. And, secondly, that the debate on exclusionary reasons can show us why law may fail to do justice in this context.

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  1. Centre for Law and Society, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh, EH8 9YL

    Emilios A. Christodoulidis

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  1. Emilios A. Christodoulidis
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Christodoulidis, E.A. The Irrationality of Merciful Legal Judgement: Exclusionary Reasoning and the Question of the Particular. Law and Philosophy 18, 215–241 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006158223544

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006158223544

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