Abstract
The need to develop a framework for allocatingnational GHG emissions based on ‘rights to theatmosphere’ is increasingly pressing since aresolution of the issues surrounding these rights arelikely to be a precondition not only for moving beyondthe Kyoto Protocol, but even for effectiveimplementation of its Articles. This paper exploressome possible variations of a framework that isderived from the principles of the Climate Convention. It takes into account differences among countries interms of their current and historical greenhouse gasemissions, the attributes that contribute to thesedifferences, and the capabilities for contributing tothe achievement of the Convention's objectives. Furthermore, it is suggested that such a frameworkshould be designed so as to decouple the allocationissue from the deliberations over a suitable GHGconcentration stabilization target or global emissionscap. Such an approach could help achieve results inthe short to mid term without waiting for resolutionof the complex debate on the desirable level ofstabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere.Sample explorations with carbon dioxide emissions dataindicate that the framework presented here can beparticularly favorable to the least-developedcountries. This is appropriate since these countrieshave not contributed substantially to the enhancedgreenhouse effect, but may be quite vulnerable to theimpacts of a changing climate, and lack thecapabilities to mitigate adverse impacts or adapt asneeded. Equally importantly, the framework alsodifferentiates between industrialized countries on thebasis of their current income and historicalemissions. The implementation of such a framework inconjunction with an emissions trading scheme may offeran appropriate path towards meeting the objectives ofthe Climate Convention.
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Notes and References
1 Human, social, and environmental costs of climate-change-related impacts have received short shrift in the literature, and most of the analyses seem to focus on the costs of mitigating GHG emissions. This can perhaps be explained by the following: there is a clear predominance of Northern analysts in the climate issue (in terms of sheer numbers and the resources they command) and their interest are often Northern-focused (and the main issue presently for the North seems to be to minimize the costs of GHG emissions abatement) while a substantial fraction of the impacts will be borne by the South. In addition, while the impacts issue is recognized as being important, research on this topic is not easy since it requires an understanding of the geographical distribution of manifestations of climate change and their interactions with local social and economic systems. On the other hand, economic analyses of carbon abatement scenarios and technology choices are relatively easier to attempt.
Article 3, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations General Assembly, A/AC.237/18 (1992).
Ibid.
This is not to say that countries will take actions that reduce GHG emissions only under a commitment regime. Often macroeconomic policies can have a substantial positive impacts on GHG emissions (see Reid, W. V. and Goldemberg, J.: 1998, Energy Policy 26, 233-237, for example).
UNFCCC, The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/CP/1997/L7/Add. 1 (1997).
Najam, A. and Sagar, A: 1998, Clim. Change 39, iii-ix.
A stark illustration is provided by the following: Under the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has a commitment to reduce, by 2008-2012, its GHG emissions by 7% and Japan by 6% while Australia is allowed to increase its emissions by 8%. Comparing these three countries on the basis of their total C-equivalent GHG emissions, we see that per-capita emissions were 6.55 tons for the U.S., 2.70 tons for Japan, and 6.63 tons for Australia; emissions on a per-unit GDP basis (per 103 PPP$) were 0.30 tons, 0.14 tons, and 0.35 tons respectively (1990 data: aggregate emissions of GHGs (Cequivalent) from UNFCCC, Summary Compilation of Annual Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Data from Annex I Parties, FCCC/CP/1998/INF.9, Table 1; GDP (purchasing-power-parity adjusted ) from World Development Indicators 1998 (World Bank, Washington D.C., 1998)). The efforts made by Japan over the last two decades, for example, to substantially reduce the energy intensity (and concomitantly the carbon intensity) of its economy does not seem to have counted for much in the Kyoto negotiations. Thus national targets in the Kyoto Protocol are not correlated with national costs of abatement - curiously, the commentaries on the Protocol have failed to dwell on this implicit cost-ineffectiveness. This is not to suggest that carbon intensity be seen as a measure for emissions reductions - it would be especially problematic to do so across countries at different stages of development - but more as an indicator that reflects an important facet of the relationship between national economic activity and contributions to GHG buildup in the atmosphere as well as give some idea of the marginal costs of abatement.
See, for example, the Indian and Chinese positions in FCCC/SB/1998/Misc.1 and the submission by Indonesia on behalf of the G-77/China in FCCC/CP/1998/Misc.7/Add.3.
On the other hand, some believe that there can be no generally agreed principle for allocation (for example, Cooper, R. N.: 1998, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 66-79). Reaching consensus on an allocation scheme certainly will not be easy, but it is difficult to agree with the sentiment that such an approach should therefore be abandoned.
<nt>See, for example</nt>, Grubb, M.: 1995, Intl. Affairs 71, 463–496; Rose, A.: 1998, Energy Policy 26, 1–3.
<nt>See, for example</nt>, Barrett. S.: 1992, Combating Global Warming: Study on Global System of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 1992, pp. 85–113; Rose, A. ibid., pp. 55–83; Rose, A.: 1990, Energy Policy 18, 927–935; Smith, K. R., Swisher, J., and Ahuja, D. R.: in Hayes, P. and Smith, K. R. (eds.), The Global Greenhouse Regime: Who Pays?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo and Earthscan, London, pp. 70–98; Smith, K. R.: 1996, in Giambelluca, T. W., and Henderson-Sellers, A. (eds.), Climate Change: Developing Southern Hemisphere Perspectives, John Wiley, New York, pp. 423–448.
<nt>See, for example</nt>, Byrne, J., Wang, Y.-D., Lee, H., and Kim, J.-D.: 1998, Energy Policy 26, 335–343; Rose, A.: 1990, Energy Policy 18, 927–935; Ridgley, M. A.: 1996, Energy Policy 24, 517–529.
<nt>See, for example</nt>, Agarwal, A. and Narain, S.: Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism, Center for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1991, and the ‘Contraction and Convergence’ proposal from the Global Commons Institute, http://www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html
Global Commons Institute, http://www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html
This formulation ignores contribution of GHG emissions from 'natural' sources such as wetlands.
Op. cit. 2.
There are at least three other ways of thinking about allocating national responsibilities. One is to carry out the allocation on the basis of historical cumulative emissions, the rationale being that this takes into account access to the atmosphere as well as to natural sinks (since all anthropogenic GHG emissions are either in the atmosphere or have been taken up by sinks). The second option can pick up on the Brazilian proposal submitted to the SBI in 1997 (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.3) by allocating responsibilities to nations in terms of the additional radiative forcing contribution of their emissions since this is the ultimate driver of climate change. The last option is the synthesis of the above two options where the responsibilities of the atmospheric GHG build-up, as well as the access to natural sinks, are shared among nations.
National emissions trends, atmospheric lifetimes, and radiative forcing contributions per unit atmospheric concentration increase will vary for different gases.
For the countries that broke up during this period (such as the Soviet Union), the responsibility of the acuumulated emissions was apportioned among the new states on the basis of population at the time of break-up. For the countries that merged (such as Germany), the total accumulated emissions were combined. For many of the African and Asian countries that became independent nations in the 1950s and early 1960s, the (generally not substantial) pre-independence emissions are ignored because it is difficult to apportion them between the pre- and post-independent entities, and the colonial powers.
Enting, I. G. and Newsam, G. N.: 1990, J. Atmos. Chem. 11, 69–87. It should be noted that this is one of many different decay models in the literature that estimate the atmospheric lifetime of carbon dioxide. Although the exact numerical assessment of the cumulative responsibility will depend upon the specific model utilized for the calculations, the overall outcomes of the scheme should not change substantially.
<nt>CO2 data from</nt> Marland, G., Boden, T. A., Andres, R. J., Brenkert, A. L., and Johnston, C. A.: 1998, Global, Regional, and National Fossil Fuel CO 2 Emissions, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, U.S.A.; Population and economic data from World Development Indicators 1998 (World Bank, Washington D.C., 1998).
For the income term, it may be preferable to use average values from a longer period, say three to five years, to smooth out any annual fluctuations in national economies.
While a range of functional forms for the framework equation may be possible, this exploration has been carried out with a few that were simple and fulfilled relevant criteria (such as diminishing marginal allocation per unit income).
Op. cit. 2.
See Sokona, Y., Humphreys, S., and Thomas, J.-P.: 1998, The Clean Development Mechanism: What Prospects for Africa?, ENDA Tiers Monde, Dakar.
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Sagar, A.D. Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions. Climatic Change 45, 511–527 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005616413549
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005616413549