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Observer-Relative Chances In Anthropic Reasoning?

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Abstract

John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range of cases, the weak anthropic principle does not giverise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. This finding could be taken to give new indirect support to the doomsday argument.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, U.K.

    Nick Bostrom

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  1. Nick Bostrom
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Bostrom, N. Observer-Relative Chances In Anthropic Reasoning?. Erkenntnis 52, 93–108 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005551304409

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005551304409

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