Abstract
The idea that causation can be reduced to transmission of an amount of some conserved quantity between events is spelled out and defended against important objections. Transmission is understood as a symmetrical relation of copresence in two distinct events. The actual asymmetry of causality has its origin in the asymmetrical character of certain irreversible physical processes and then spreads through the causal net. This conception is compatible with the possibility of backwards causation and with a causal theory of time. Genidentity, the persistence of concrete objects, can be given an explanation in causal terms. The transmission theory is shown to escape difficulties faced by two important alternative theories of causation: Salmon's (1984) Mark Transmission Theory and Dowe's (1992a) Conserved Quantities Theory.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M.: 1980, ‘Identity Through Time’, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Aronson, J. J.: 1971a, ‘On the Grammar of ‘Cause'’, Synthese 22, 417–418.
Aronson, J. J.: 1971b, ‘The Legacy of Hume's Analysis of Causation’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 2, 135–165.
Aronson, J. J.: 1982, ‘Unentangling Ontology from Epistemology in Causation’, Erkenntnis 18, 293–305.
Aronson, J. J.: 1985, ‘Conditions versus Transference: A Reply to Ehring’, Synthese 63, 249–257.
Campbell, K.: 1990, Abstract Particulars, Blackwell, Oxford.
Carnap, R.: 1928, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Weltkreis Verlag, Berlin-Schlachtensee.
Cummins, R.: 1983, The Nature of Psychological Expanation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Davidson, D.: 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Dieks, D.: 1986, ‘Physics and the Direction of Causation’, Erkenntnis 25, 85–110.
Dowe, P.: 1992a, ‘Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory’, Phil. of Science 59, 195–216.
Dowe, P.: 1992b, ‘Process Causality and Asymmetry’, Erkenntnis 37, 179–196.
Dowe, P.: 1992c, ‘An Empiricist Defence of the Causal Account of Explanation’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6, 123–128.
Dowe, P.: 1995a, ‘Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon’, Phil. of Science 62, 321–333.
Dowe, P.: 1995b, ‘What's Right and What's Wrong with Transference Theories’, Erkenntnis 42, 363–374.
Dowe, P.: 1996, ‘Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes’, Mind 105, 1–22.
Ehring, D.: 1986, ‘The Transference Theory of Causation’, Synthese 67, 249–258.
Fair, D.: 1979, ‘Causation and the Flow of Energy’, Erkenntnis 14, 219–250.
Grünbaum, A.: 1973, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Horwich, P.: 1987, Asymmetries in Time, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Kitcher P.: 1989, ‘Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World’, in P. Kitcher and W. Salmon (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 13, Scientific Explanation, pp. 410–505, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Krajewski, W.: 1982, ‘Four Conceptions of Causation’, in W. Krajewski (ed.), Polish Essays in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Lewin, K.: 1923, ‘Die zeitliche Geneseordnung’, in C.-F. Graumann (ed.), Kurt-Lewin Werkausgabe, vol. I (A. Métraux ed.), Hans Huber, Bern, and Klett, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 213–232.
Quine, W. v. O.: 1973, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, LaSalle, Ill.
Quine, W. v. O.: 1976, The Ways of Paradox, Revised and enlarged edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Quine, W. v. O.: 1985, ‘Events and Reification’, in Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Reichenbach, H.: 1928, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Berlin; engl. transl.: The Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover, New York, 1957.
Reichenbach, H.: 1956, The Direction of Time, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Russell, B.: 1914, Our Knowledge of the External World, Allen and Unwin, London, 1926.
Russell, B.: 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Allen and Unwin, London, 5th edition, 1966.
Salmon, W.: 1978, #x2018;WhyAsk“Why?”? - An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation’, Proc. and Addresses of the Am. Phil. Association 51(6), 683–705.
Salmon, W.: 1984, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Salmon, W.: 1994, ‘Causality Without Counterfactuals’, Phil. of Science 61, 297–312.
Sosa, E. and Tooley, M.: 1993, ‘Introduction’, in Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tooley, M.: 1990, ‘Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism’, Phil. and Phen. Res. 50, Suppl. Vol., 215–236.
Vendler, Z.: 1967, ‘Facts and Events’, in Linguistics and Philosophy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Williams, D.: 1953, ‘On the Elements of Being’, Rev. of Metaphysics 7, 3–18 and 171-192.
Zucchi, A.: 1993, The Language of Proposition and Events, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kistler, M. Reducing Causality to Transmission. Erkenntnis 48, 1–25 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005374229251
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005374229251