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Rethinking Kaplan's ''afterthoughts'' About 'That': An Exorcism of Semantical Demons

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Abstract

Kaplan (1977) proposes a neo-Fregean theory of demonstratives which, despite its departure from a certain problematic Fregean thesis, I argue, ultimately founders on account of its failure to give up the Fregean desideratum of a semantic theory that it provide an account of cognitive significance. I explain why Kaplan's (1989) afterthoughts don't remedy this defect. Finally, I sketch an alternative nonsolipsistic picture of demonstrative reference which idealizes away from an agent's narrowly characterizable psychological state, and instead relies on the robust multiply realizable relation between the skilled agent and demonstrated object.

When the unclean spirit has gone out of a person, it wanders through waterless regions looking for a resting place, but it finds none. Then it says, 'I will return to my house from which I came.' When it comes, it finds it empty, swept, and put in order. Then it goes and brings along seven other spirits more evil than itself, and they enter and live there; and the last state of that person is worse than the first. So will it be also with this evil generation.

– attributed to Jesus (Matthew 12:43-45, New Revised Standard Version of the Bible)

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Lalor, B. Rethinking Kaplan's ''afterthoughts'' About 'That': An Exorcism of Semantical Demons. Erkenntnis 47, 67–87 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005365918489

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