Abstract
The effect of changes in industry structure on the ability tomaintain a cooperative level of tariff lobbying are analyzed in arepeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is theenforcement mechanism. The difficulty of maintaining cooperation isidentified with the minimum discount factor necessary for themaintenance of cooperation. Factors which increase this criticalvalue of the discount parameter are said to make cooperation moredifficult. Some changes in industry structure which reduce measuredconcentration have ambiguous effects, while others may makecooperation among a given group of firms more likely.
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Pecorino, P. Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem. Public Choice 106, 203–220 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005257428424
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005257428424