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Elisabeth R. Gerber, The populist paradox: Interest group influence and the promise of direct legislation

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 90089-1427, USA

    John G. Matsusaka

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  1. John G. Matsusaka
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Matsusaka, J.G. Elisabeth R. Gerber, The populist paradox: Interest group influence and the promise of direct legislation. Public Choice 104, 394–397 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005255412213

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005255412213

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