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Public Choice

, Volume 106, Issue 1–2, pp 137–155 | Cite as

Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play

  • T.K. Ahn
  • Elinor Ostrom
  • David Schmidt
  • Robert Shupp
  • James Walker
Article

Abstract

The impact of the cardinal relationships amongpecuniary payoffs, and of social history and reputation, on thechoice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games isexperimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoffvalues linked to ``fear'' and ``greed'' are important as predictorsof behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoffdominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games alsoincreases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. Theeffect of past play is strongest when individuals are matchedrepeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted tobeing matched randomly with another player.

Keywords

Public Finance Social History Coordination Game Cooperative Play Past Play 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • T.K. Ahn
    • 1
  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 1
  • David Schmidt
    • 2
  • Robert Shupp
    • 2
  • James Walker
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityBloomingtonU.S.A
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsIndiana UniversityBloomingtonU.S.A

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