Abstract
(1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter are conscious of what they are doing.
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LUKAS BÖÖK. Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems. Synthese 118, 105–117 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005188725731
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005188725731
Keywords
- Rational Consequence
- Intentional Strategy
- Intentional System
- Reflexive Intentional