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Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth

Abstract

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.

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Gómez-torrente, M. Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth. Synthese 117, 375–408 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005165824990

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Keywords

  • Logical Consequence
  • Logical Truth
  • Continuum Hypothesis
  • Logical Constant
  • Completeness Axiom