Abstract
What are the conditions for ``moral'' conduct in internationalpolitics to be viable? This question is explored by modelingregional conflicts as a two-stage game in which imitation of othercountries' strategies and public opinion formation processes areassumed to have an impact on a country's strategic choice. Theresults derived by using the notion of an evolutionary stablestrategy point to some very special conditions for moral conduct toemerge and survive, a fact that may explain the historical findingthat there have been rather rare periods during which peaceableness did indeedprevail in international politics, at least at a regional level.
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Witt, U. Between Appeasement and Belligerent Moralism: The Evolution of Moral Conduct in International Politics. Public Choice 106, 365–388 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005154920068
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005154920068