Abstract
The authors use a proportional hazards framework toinvestigate the impact of various countrycharacteristics on the duration of time taken toratify the United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (FCCC). The most significant findingsare that the conditional probability of ratificationis positively related to total CO2 emissions andthe presence of civil liberties. The finding foremissions indicates that large, polluting countrieswere under great political pressure to ratify theFCCC. The latter finding is consistent with earlierresearch that found that democratic freedoms raisedthe probability of signing the Montreal Protocol.
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Fredriksson, P.G., Gaston, N. Ratification of the 1992 Climate Change Convention: What Determines Legislative Delay?. Public Choice 104, 345–368 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005129300402
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005129300402