Abstract
This paper examines voting by U.S. Representatives onthe North American Free Trade Agreement, the UruguayRound Agreement, and most-favored nation status forChina. Using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior, we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators' voteson the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills. Labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade. Economicconditions in each member's district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives' voting decisions.
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Baldwin, R.E., Magee, C.S. Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills. Public Choice 105, 79–101 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005121716315
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005121716315