Abstract
Previous theoretical and empirical research findsenhanced veto authority has little systematic effecton level of spending. This paper takes a new tact,examining the effect of veto power on thecentralization of governmental services. It proposesand tests a model of federalism in which differenttypes of veto authority lead to differing degrees ofcentralization when the executive and legislature havedisparate preferences over the level of governmentthat should provide services. Empirical resultsindicate governors in the United States use enhancedveto authority to centralize state and localgovernment spending.
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Baker, S.H. Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?. Public Choice 104, 63–79 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005119311685
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005119311685