Abstract
The link between business cycles and the democratic politicalsystem has long been recognized by economists. However, thedeterminants of political business cycles are not well understood.We discuss several institutional and behavioral determinants ofthose cycles, such as revolving-door appointments, term limits andpreferences of the incumbent politician, electorate and businesscommunity concerning the intertemporal pattern of publicexpenditure. We show how they affect the cycle's amplitude in thecontext of a rational-expectations model.
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Baleiras, R.N., Santos, V. Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles. Public Choice 104, 121–147 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005117901380
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005117901380