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Public Choice

, Volume 102, Issue 3–4, pp 341–364 | Cite as

Governance and Growth: A Simple Hypothesis Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Productivity Growth

  • Mancur OlsonJr.
  • Naveen Sarna
  • Anand V. Swamy
Article

Abstract

Cross-country evidence shows that a subset of developing countries isgrowing very rapidly, taking advantage of opportunities to ``catch-up'' atthe same time that other developing countries are growing slowly. We arguethat this is due to differences in the quality of governance. Inparticular we show that productivity growth is higher in better-governedcountries.

Keywords

Public Finance Productivity Growth Simple Hypothesis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mancur OlsonJr.
    • 1
  • Naveen Sarna
    • 1
  • Anand V. Swamy
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkU.S.A.

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