Abstract
In most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted. Two different viewsare presented to explain why: the Chicagoan view (“Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis”)and the Virginian view (inefficient outcome of political bargaining). A vertically structuredempirical model of the Austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses. Quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers/taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented.
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Salhofer, K., Hofreither, M.F. & Sinabell, F. Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria. Public Choice 102, 229–246 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005024920319
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005024920319