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To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory

Abstract

This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken.

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SOBER, E. To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory. Synthese 115, 355–373 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005012607804

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005012607804

Keywords

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Game Theory
  • Expected Utility
  • True Belief
  • Induction Argument