Skip to main content

Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument

Abstract

The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

REFERENCES

  • Anscombe, G. E. M.: 1971, Causality and Determination, Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge University.

  • Ayer, A.: 1954, 'Freedom and Necessity', in his Philosophical Essays, MacMillan, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M.: 1964, 'Bringing About the Past', Philosophical Review 73, 338–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ekstrom, L. W.: 1995, 'Causes and Nested Counterfactuals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, 574–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, J. M.: 1983, 'Incompatibilism', Philosophical Studies 43, 127–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flint, T. P.: 1987, 'Compatibilism and the Argument from Unavoidability', Journal of Philosophy 84, 423–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ginet, C.: 1990, On Action, Cambridge University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gorovitz, S.: 1964, 'Leaving the Past Alone', Philosophical Review 73, 360–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hobart, R.: 1934, 'Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It', Mind 43, 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T.: 1985, 'Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument', Philosophical Studies 47, 339–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, P.: 1987, Asymmetries in Time, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J.: 1973, 'Causes and Counterfactuals', Journal of Philosophy 70, 570–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1973, 'Causation', The Journal of Philosophy 70, 556–67. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers II, 159–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1973, 'Events', Philosophical Papers II, 241–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1981, 'Are We Free to Break the Laws?', Theoria 47, 113–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen, P.: 1975, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', Philosophical Studies 27, 185–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen, P.: 1983, An Essay on Free Will, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihvelin, K.: 1991, 'Freedom, Causation, and Counterfactuals', Philosophical Studies 64, 161–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vihvelin, K.: 1995, 'Causes, Effects, and Counterfactual Dependence', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, 560–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vihvelin, K.: 1995, 'Reply to “Causes and Nested Counterfactuals”', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, 579–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

EKSTROM, L.W. Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument. Synthese 115, 333–354 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005009029926

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005009029926

Keywords

  • Actual World
  • Causal Power
  • Close World
  • Counterfactual Dependence
  • Consequence Argument