Abstract
We examine a two-stage contest in which players in twogroups compete noncooperatively to win a rent. In thefirst stage, each group selects a finalist. The twofinalists compete for the rent in the second stage.First-stage efforts are carried over to the secondstage in the sense that they are partly effective inthe second stage as well. We show the following. Inthe case of player-specific carryovers, therent-dissipation rate increases in the carryover rate.With the carryover rate equal to one, the rent isfully dissipated. In the case of group-specificcarryovers, however, the rent-dissipation rate isindependent of the carryover rate.
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Baik, K.H., Lee, S. Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers. Public Choice 103, 285–296 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005003713923
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005003713923