Abstract
The analogues to Pareto dominance and Pareto superiority, majority dominance and Majority superiority, allow restriction on the domain of outcomes for majority-rule choices. The logical structure of the argument extends and confirms the proposition that the effective alternatives for collective choice are endogenously determined by the existent rule for making choices. Orthodox public choice theory has, explicitly or implicitly, presumed that the choice alternatives are exogenous to the rule through which choices are made.
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Buchanan, J. Majoritarian logic. Public Choice 97, 13–21 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004998431130
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004998431130