How to gerrymander: A formal analysis

Abstract

The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness.

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Sherstyuk, K. How to gerrymander: A formal analysis. Public Choice 95, 27–49 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004986314885

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Keywords

  • Fair Division
  • Lyapunov Theorem
  • Electoral Support
  • Support Index
  • Geographic Constraint