The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance contracts

Public Choice volume 96, pages345–362(1998)Cite this article

Abstract

Many types of public goods can be produced privately by profit seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance contract, called a dominant assurance contract. I model the dominant assurance contract as a game and show that the pure strategy equilibrium has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The game is also modelled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash game.

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Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, 47306-0340, U.S.A

    Alexander Tabarrok

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  1. Alexander Tabarrok
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Tabarrok, A. The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance contracts. Public Choice 96, 345–362 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004957109535

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Keywords

  • Public Good
  • Public Finance
  • Modify Form
  • Incomplete Information
  • Pure Strategy