Abstract
In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollock’s argument is ineffective -- because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollock’s argument by restricting his conclusion to theories that do involve action-guiding norms and providing a better reason to think that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. But I claim that if Pollock’s argument is made strong enough to rule out all externalisms, it rules out too much, namely, any plausible conception of epistemic norms.
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Jacobson, S. Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110, 381–397 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004941211847
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004941211847
Keywords
- Good Reason
- Internalist Norm
- Externalist Theory
- Contemporary Theory
- Epistemic Norm