Abstract
The paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one-party states, taking as an example socialist Yugoslavia. We assume that the number of the Party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six Yugoslav republics in the 1953–1988 period. We find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression. These findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Frey, B.S. and Eichenberger, R. (1994). The political economy of stabilization programmes in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 169–190.
Gilison, J. M. (1968). Soviet elections as a measure of dissent. American Political Science Review 62: 814–826.
Hillman, A. and Schnytzer, A. (1986). Illegal economic activities and purges in a Soviet-type economy: A rent-seeking perspective. International Review of Law and Economics 6: 87–99.
Lafay, J.-D. (1981). Empirical analysis of politico-economic interaction in East European countries. Soviet Studies 33: 386–400.
Nannestad, P. and Paldam, M. (1994). The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice 79: 213–245.
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paldam, M. (1987). Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946–83. Public Choice 52: 143–168.
Panzer, J. and Paredes, R.D (1991). The role of economic issues in elections: The case of the 1988 Chilean presidential referendum. Public Choice 71: 51–59.
Vušković, B. (1986). Fluktuacija članova SKJ 1973–84 [The fluctuation of the LCY membership 1973–1984]. Pogledi 6(3–4): 101–110.
Wiatr, J. (1970). Political parties, interest representation and economic development in Poland. American Political Science Review 64: 1239–1245.
Wintrobe, R. (1990). The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship. American Political Science Review 84: 849–872.
Županov, J. (1983). Znanje, društveni sistem i klasni interes [Knowledge, social system, and class interest]. Naše teme 27: 1048–1054.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schnytzer, A., Šušteršič, J. Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange. Public Choice 94, 117–134 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004917324845
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004917324845