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Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality

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Abstract

This paper shows that, if the performance of the economy is independent of the identities of individuals, then many welfare criteria yield sets of optimal social states that are equal to the Pareto optimal set. This result is proved for income distributions and extended to more general social choice problems. If the independence condition holds, then the set of optimal states is invariant to the adoption of an anonymity axiom, and to the utility information available.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, College of Arts of Sciences, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, 49008-5023, USA

    Paul D. Thistle

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  1. Paul D. Thistle
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Thistle, P.D. Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality. Theory and Decision 45, 161–173 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004906307146

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004906307146

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