Abstract
Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium (see this issue). In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.
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References
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Rasmusen, E. Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof. Public Choice 91, 209–214 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004903313621
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004903313621