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Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge

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Larkin, W.S. Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96, 239–252 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004306526255

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004306526255

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