Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 449–476

A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some Alternatives

  • Ken Gemes
Article

Abstract

This paper develops a semantical model – theoretic account of (logical) content complementing the syntactically specified account of content developed in “A New Theory of Content I”, JPL 23: 596–620, 1994. Proofs of Completeness are given for both propositional and quantificational languages (without identity). Means for handling a quantificational language with identity are also explored. Finally, this new notion of content is compared, in respect of both logical properties and philosophical applications, to alternative partitions of the standard consequence class relation proposed by Stelzner, Schurz and Wiengartner.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ken Gemes
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyYale UniversityNew HavenU.S.A.

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