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Three Problems for “strong” Modal Fictionalism

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Program The Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia

    Daniel Nolan

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  1. Daniel Nolan
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Nolan, D. Three Problems for “strong” Modal Fictionalism. Philosophical Studies 87, 259–275 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004218817629

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