Abstract
This articleanalyzes the links between the internal organization of the firmand macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth modelin which firms face agency costs due to the existence of asymmetriesof information and the formation of vertical collusions insidethose firms. To respond to the threat of collusion, optimal collusion-proofincentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive sidecontracting within organizations. Collusion affects thereforethe firms' profitability, the incentives to innovate, and, finally,the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. On theother hand, when the growth rate is small, the prospects of long-termrelationships within firms increase the agents' incentives toinvest in a better collusive technology. We then discuss thetwo-way relationships between the structure of internal transactioncosts, organizational technologies, and macroeconomic growth.
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Martimort, D., Verdier, T. The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 5, 315–340 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026574718420
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026574718420