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Towards a Structured Design of Electronic Negotiations

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Abstract

Global communication networks and advances in information technology enable the design of information systems facilitating effective formulation and efficient resolution of negotiation problems. Increasingly, these systems guide negotiators in clarifying the relevant issues, provide media for offer formulation and exchange, and help in achieving an agreement. In practice, the task of analysing, modelling, designing and implementing electronic negotiation media demands a systematic, traceable and reproducible approach. An engineering approach to media specification and construction has these characteristics. In this paper, we provide a rationale for the engineering approach that allows pragmatic adoption of economic and social sciences perspectives on negotiated decisions for the purpose of supporting and undertaking electronic negotiations. Similarities and differences of different theories that underlie on-going studies of electronic negotiations are identified. This provides a basis for integration of different theories and approaches for the specific purpose of the design of effective electronic negotiations. Drawing on diverse streams of literature in different fields such as economics, management, computer, and behavioural sciences, we present an example of an integration of three significant streams of theoretical and applied research involving negotiations, traditional auctions and on-line auctions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Informatics, Technical University of Munich, Germany

    Martin Bichler

  2. School of Management, University of Ottawa, Canada

    Gregory Kersten

  3. Information Management and Systems, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Germany

    Stefan Strecker

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  1. Martin Bichler
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  2. Gregory Kersten
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Bichler, M., Kersten, G. & Strecker, S. Towards a Structured Design of Electronic Negotiations. Group Decision and Negotiation 12, 311–335 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024867820235

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