Abstract
This paper is part of a wider research project with the objective of creating computational testbeds for designing and testing new mechanisms—new economic and political institutions. Here we illustrate the power of such an approach by testing two call market designs in a repeated demand-supply environment. We find there to be significant differences in performance depending on the information provided to the traders between calls. In particular, we find that both dynamic and static performance is better, less volitility and higher gains from trade, if traders receive less information between calls.
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Arifovic, J., Ledyard, J. Information and Dynamics: Sequences of Call Markets. Information Systems Frontiers 5, 39–45 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022089704530
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022089704530