Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 53–97 | Cite as

Bayesianism and Language Change

  • Jon Williamson

Abstract

Bayesian probability is normally defined over a fixed language or eventspace. But in practice language is susceptible to change, and thequestion naturally arises as to how Bayesian degrees of belief shouldchange as language changes. I argue here that this question poses aserious challenge to Bayesianism. The Bayesian may be able to meet thischallenge however, and I outline a practical method for changing degreesof belief over changes in finite propositional languages.

Bayesian Bayesian network inductive logic language change maximum entropy 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jon Williamson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKing's CollegeLondonU.K.

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