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Financial Penalties Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Policy Discourse and Strategies for Reform

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Abstract

Many families did not leave welfare of their own accord but instead were forced off, sanctioned, for failure to conform to new, strict requirements (Bloom & Winstead, 2002). Studies of “leavers” indicate that many of these leavers are among the families that do not receive needed health insurance, food stamps, and child care assistance for which they remain eligible (Loprest, 2001; Zedlewski & Gruber, 2001). Sanctioned families are less likely to do well after leaving welfare compared to other leavers (Goldberg & Schott, 2000). As part of TANF reauthorization, Congress should prohibit states from sanctioning if they have not met certain requirements: conducted an assessment, made accommodations for people with physical/mental impairments or other barriers, and instituted strong pre-sanction and post-sanction procedures.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy, University of Delaware, 298L Graham Hall, Newark, DE, 19716

    Karen A. Curtis

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  1. Karen A. Curtis
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Curtis, K.A. Financial Penalties Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Policy Discourse and Strategies for Reform. Journal of Family and Economic Issues 23, 239–260 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020343126400

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