Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 21–45 | Cite as

Tacit Coordination in Choice Between Certain Outcomes in Endogenously Determined Lotteries

Abstract

Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.

interactive decision making lotteries Nash equilibrium tacit coordination 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amnon Rapoport
    • 1
  • Darryl A. Seale
    • 2
  • Lisa Ordóñez
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Management and Policy405 McClelland Hall, University of ArizonaTucsonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Management4505 Maryland Parkway, University of Nevada in Las VegasLas VegasUSA
  3. 3.Department of Management and Policy405 McClelland Hall, University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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