Abstract
It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a “locutionary” level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which is labeled the “moonlighting” use of thing-talk.
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Crimmins, M. Thing Talk Moonlighting. Philosophical Studies 108, 83–98 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015712231136
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015712231136