Abstract
Elected politicians can choose to decide themselves or to delegate competence. Delegation can occur in the constitutional stage, but is most common in the post-constitutional stage. Furthermore, domestic delegation can be distinguished from international delegation. The authors propose to analyze both delegation decisions within a unified framework and apply it to eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have experienced substantial constitutional change recently. The main differences among these countries with regard to delegation are portrayed, their origins are traced and their effects analyzed.
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Salzberger, E.M., Voigt, S. On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe. Constitutional Political Economy 13, 25–52 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013635123722
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013635123722