Synthese

, Volume 129, Issue 3, pp 439–449 | Cite as

The Lottery: A Paradox Regained And Resolved

  • R. Weintraub
Article

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. Weintraub
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTel-Aviv UniversityRamat Aviv Tel-AvivIsrael

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