Advertisement

Book Review

  • Roberto Weber
Article
  • 44 Downloads

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aumann, R.J. and M. Maschler (1995), Repeated Games of Incomplete Information. MIT Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  2. Brown, J.N. and R.W. Rosenthal (1990), “Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-Examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment, ” Econometrica, 58(5), 1065–1081.Google Scholar
  3. Camerer, C.F. and R.M. Hogarth (1999), “The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital–Labor–Production Framework, ” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 7–42.Google Scholar
  4. Hart, Sergiu and Abraham Neyman (1995), “Introduction, ” in Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman (Eds.), Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.Google Scholar
  5. Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under risk, ” Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.Google Scholar
  6. Milgrom,6P. and N. Stokey (1982), “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, ” Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 17–27.Google Scholar
  7. O'Neill, Barry (1987), “Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum games, ” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 84, 2106–2109.Google Scholar
  8. Simon, H.A. (1979a), Models of Thought. New Haven. Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Simon, H.A. (1979b), “Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, ” American Economic Review, 69(4), 493–513.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Weber
    • 1
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburg

Personalised recommendations