References
Aumann, R.J. and M. Maschler (1995), Repeated Games of Incomplete Information. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Brown, J.N. and R.W. Rosenthal (1990), “Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-Examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment, ” Econometrica, 58(5), 1065–1081.
Camerer, C.F. and R.M. Hogarth (1999), “The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital–Labor–Production Framework, ” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 7–42.
Hart, Sergiu and Abraham Neyman (1995), “Introduction, ” in Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman (Eds.), Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under risk, ” Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
Milgrom,6P. and N. Stokey (1982), “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, ” Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 17–27.
O'Neill, Barry (1987), “Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum games, ” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 84, 2106–2109.
Simon, H.A. (1979a), Models of Thought. New Haven. Yale University Press.
Simon, H.A. (1979b), “Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, ” American Economic Review, 69(4), 493–513.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weber, R. Book Review. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 7, 63–68 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011329600156
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011329600156