Abstract
Experiments are reported that add to the growing literature on the voluntary provision of public goods. Information conditions are manipulated to address whether early findings of above-equilibrium contributions to a public good are a result of complete information regarding the symmetry of the game. No significant information effect was found. Further, by examining designs with an interior Nash equilibrium, this research suggests that the non-zero contributions observed in the previous dominant strategy environments, where the prediction was a zero level of provision of the public good, were not simply transitional errors as the system converged to a boundary equilibrium.
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Isaac, R.M., Walker, J.M. Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. Experimental Economics 1, 191–206 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009996324622
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009996324622