Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 531–534 | Cite as

The Minimal Quota for a Complete Majority Relation to be Transitive

  • Laurent Vidu


In this paper, we show that 2/3 is the minimal quota that guarantees the transitivity of a complete majority relation independently of the number of candidates.

λ-majority quota-rules group decision 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laurent Vidu
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.GEMMA-CREMEUniversité de CaenCaen, CedexFrance
  2. 2.Institut für Mathematische WirtschaftsforschungUniversität BielefeldGermany

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