Abstract
Kutschera's criticism of an objectivist theory of mind is shown to rest on a premise which an objectivist need not accept, namely, that there is a deep metaphysical distinction between the physical and the psychological domain. This premise can be rejected on naturalistic grounds. Referring to the work of Rosenthal, Dennett and Davidson, it is argued that less metaphysically loaded explanations can be given of what is subjective about the mind.
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Brandl, J.L. Die Natur des Subjektiven: Einige Bemerkungen zu Kutscheras Objektivismus-Kritik. Erkenntnis 48, 183–188 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005450129483
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005450129483